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Narrating the ‘Asylum Story’: Between Literary and Legal Storytelling  
 
Abstract 
In 2014 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees reported that the number of 
forcibly displaced people worldwide had exceeded fifty million for the first time since World 
War Two (UNHCR, 2014). The entanglement of literary and legal technologies in the asylum 
decision-making process as it operates today in legal, advocacy and creative circles, excludes 
asylum seekers from incorporation as rights-bearing individuals if they do not conform to a 
particular narrative of persecution. In a moment of anxiety over “the meaning and scope of 
citizenship” (Slaughter 2009, 27) comparable to that of the post-War period – and facing a 
refugee crisis of similar scale – an investigation of the means by which asylum protection is 
constituted by and enacted through narrative forms is long overdue. This essay analyses the 
procedural characteristics of the asylum decision-making process, which produces what I call 
the ‘asylum story’: an idealized version of refugeehood on which the civic incorporation of 
the asylum seeker depends and which circulates in a narrative economy that sets the terms for 
the enunciation of refugee experience. It considers how the notion of a discoverable truth has 
inflected literary engagements with asylum, which are beset by the same anxieties around 
veracity and authenticity endemic to the legal process of decision-making on asylum, and 
ends with an analysis of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s short story ‘The American Embassy’ 
from her 2009 collection The Thing Around Your Neck. I argue that the story exposes the 
narrative instabilities of the asylum determination process, highlighting the ways in which 
those international institutions designed to protect human rights continue to be deeply 
implicated in regimes of truth which regulate upon whom they may be conferred.      
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In 2014 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees reported that the number of 
forcibly displaced people worldwide had exceeded fifty million for the first time since World 
War Two (UNHCR, 2014). Given that institutional mechanisms for dealing with 
displacement were part of the codification of human rights into international law in the post-
War period, the historical parallel is instructive. Though the geopolitical context has changed, 
the legal instruments in place to deal with the current spike in international refugee 
movement remain those that were laid down in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 protocol, which defined who may be officially designated a refugee. 
The Convention describes a refugee as someone who has a “well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion” (UN, 1951, 1967). Today, the millions of families and individuals on the move, 
living in refugee camps and languishing in detention centres in Europe, the United States, 
Australian territories, Africa the Middle-East, must all conform to this definition in order to 
be recognised as a refugee under international law. For those seeking to resettle in another 
country, legal recognition as a refugee is a condition of their right to asylum. Whether the 
designation as a ‘Convention refugee’ is given within the country of potential resettlement, or 
by a national embassy or the UNHCR in the country of origin, all must bear credible witness 
to the events that have led to their claim for protection in a process that has barely changed 
since it was enshrined in law in 1951. They must provide for decision makers a “well-
founded” narrative of persecution based on verifiable evidence.i   
 In his rigorous study, Human Rights Inc: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and 
International Law (2009), Joseph Slaughter argues that legal conceptions of human 
personhood developed in human rights discourses have historically been reflected in, but also 
produced by, literature: just as the law enables “some narrative plots and literary genres over 
others”, literature has “historically favored and enabled some formulations of the law” (11). 
Both literature and the law, according to Slaughter, project the person as a “moral creature 
capable of bearing rights and duties” (17) who undergoes a process of civic “incorporation” 
(21) and emerges as a fully-enfranchised individual. Charting the development of conceptions 
of human rights since the eighteenth century, Slaughter argues that: 
 
The movement of the subject from pure subjection to self-
regulation describes the plot trajectory of the dominant 
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transition narrative of modernization, which both the 
Bildungsroman and human rights law take for granted and 
intensify in their progressive visions of human personality 
development. (9) 
 
For Slaughter, the Bildungsroman was, and continues to be, “the predominant formal literary 
technology in which social outsiders narrate affirmative claims for inclusion in a regime of 
rights and responsibilities” (27). The coming into personhood of the bildung narrative is thus 
a process of civic incorporation which confers rights. But the legal and literary plotlines that 
project modern personhood have tended to exclude those seeking incorporation in a sovereign 
state other than their country of origin. As has been well-documented, the paradox at the 
heart of the operation of human rights as a legal instrument means that, in Hannah Arendt’s 
famous words, “a right to have rights” (1973, 298) is in fact predicated on national belonging. 
Now, as in 1951, “a sphere that is above the nations does not exist” (Arendt 1973, 298).ii In 
the case of asylum, claimants must make a request to one sovereign state for protection from 
another, and the decision over asylum is taken by a state representative such as an 
immigration officer or judge. As I will argue, the process of claiming asylum follows its own 
rigid plotlines, producing an idealized refugee personhood rooted in the 1951 Convention.iii 
The entanglement of literary and legal technologies in the asylum decision-making process as 
it operates today in legal, advocacy and creative circles, excludes asylum seekers from 
incorporation as rights-bearing individuals if they do not conform to a particular narrative of 
persecution. Moreover, the basis on which the state, or state representative, makes a decision 
on asylum protection is one of narrative interpretation.  
In a moment of anxiety over “the meaning and scope of citizenship” (Slaughter 2009, 
27) comparable to that of the post-War period – and with refugee numbers of a similar scale – 
an investigation of the means by which asylum protection is constituted by and enacted 
through narrative forms is long overdue. While this essay does not attempt such a 
comprehensive study, my point of departure is an analysis of the procedural characteristics of 
the asylum decision-making process, which demands a particular narrative of persecution for 
the conferment of refugee status. More than any other aspect of human rights legislation, the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees depends almost entirely on the story of the 
claimant: it is “the most intensely narrative mode of legal adjudication” (Millbank 2009, 2). 
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As such, the system produces what I call here the ‘asylum story’: an idealized version of 
refugeehood on which the civic incorporation of the asylum seeker depends and which 
circulates in a narrative economy that sets the terms for the enunciation of refugee 
experience. Such models of ideal refugeehood, produced by a peculiarly restrictive set of 
narrative conditions, have material effects which can often mean the difference between life 
and death for asylum claimants. This is widely recognised in refugee studies, which is 
attentive to the role of narrative in the asylum regime (see, for example, Eastmond, 2007; 
Monnier, 1995). Katrijn Maryns (2006) in particular has analysed extensively the role of 
language in the asylum interview. But literary-cultural methodologies, attuned to sociological 
and political registers, can shed new light on the ways in which refugee or asylum seeker 
status is both a legal determination and a subjectivity shaped by and through language and 
storytelling. Critical analysis of how the ‘asylum story’ operates in the world is vital to the 
ongoing task of preserving rights for those who can no longer claim protection from the state. 
This paper builds on a growing attention to the particularities of asylum and refugee 
subjectivity – and its material relationship to the law – within postcolonial studies, which has 
led in turn to thoroughgoing re-assessments of the ways in which asylum seeking fits 
conventional paradigms of diasporic accommodation and belonging.iv  
Beginning with an examination of the legal operation of the asylum determination 
process, the production of the ‘asylum story’ and the narrative contexts in which it operates, I 
will chart the inherent contradictions in a process that relies on narrative retelling – a 
reconstruction of whatever fragments of their experiences the claimant can provide – yet 
which insists on “the notion of truth as objective and discoverable by a decision-maker who 
is a fact ‘finder”’ (Millbank 2009, 5). I proceed to consider how this notion of a discoverable 
truth has inflected literary engagements with asylum, which are beset by the same anxieties 
around veracity and authenticity endemic to the legal process of adjudication. I end with an 
asylum story that refuses to conform to the normative expectations of the legal regime: 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s short story ‘The American Embassy’ from her 2009 collection 
The Thing Around Your Neck, in which a Nigerian woman seeks asylum at the United States 
embassy in Lagos. ‘The American Embassy’ presents the asylum system as an important site 
of tension which, while providing a forum for bearing witness to historical events – both as 
the basis for rights claims and as a powerful means of giving voice to marginalized 
experiences – also presents the speaker with a pre-defined set of narrative plotlines. For 
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Adichie, the asylum story remains intricately bound to the narrative forms in which it is told. 
A writer who has been consistently interested in issues of narrative legitimacy, Adichie 
exposes the narrative instabilities of material systems of regulation like the asylum 
determination process, highlighting the ways in which those international institutions 
designed to protect human rights continue to be deeply implicated in regimes of truth which 
regulate upon whom they may be conferred.     
 
Legal plotlines 
 
While there are inevitably procedural variations in signatory countries, the fundamental 
operation of the Refugee Convention has not changed since its inception in 1951 and it 
remains the most widely-used definition of a refugee.v The process is based on a refugee’s 
ability to provide a credible account of their persecution and, where possible, to prove the 
authenticity of their claim through documentary and often bodily evidence. In practice, 
however, the process relies heavily on the self-presentation of the individual claimant; their 
ability to convince an immigration officer or judge. The claimant must narrate themselves 
into a position of legitimacy. As Millbank points out, the dialogic nature of this interaction 
between teller and listener is rarely taken into account despite the fact that decision makers 
are “choosing (based on evidence, instinct, emotion, or a combination) to believe, or to 
disbelieve, in [the story] or the person telling it” (2009, 5). As their interpretive effect on the 
asylum story is unacknowledged, the decision maker is positioned as a “fact finder” 
(Millbank 2009, 5), whose role it is to ascertain a discoverable truth. This foundational piece 
of human rights legislation thus not only shapes the kinds of rights-bearing individuals we 
aspire to be – “incorporated citizen-subjects” (Slaughter 2009, 249) – but it also draws a clear 
line between fact and fiction, the crossing of which can have devastating implications for the 
claimant. This line divides those whose ‘authentic’ narratives allow them to become fully 
incorporated individuals, and those who are deemed incredible candidates for 
enfranchisement because their stories remain unsubstantiated. One reason, perhaps, why the 
term ‘bogus asylum seeker’ has gained such discursive power (in Britain at least), is because 
those designated as such are thought to be bearing false witness in the context of a normative 
narrative regime which posits a particular conception of a persecuted person.   
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The events leading to an asylum claim are most often presented orally at an initial 
immigration interview and then consolidated into an asylum story at subsequent hearings and 
appeals. Sociolinguist Jan Blommaert has carried out extensive research into the relationship 
between asylum narratives and decision-making processes in Europe, linking it to larger 
trends of inequality arising from globalization. Drawing on Dell Hymes’ and Courtenay 
Cazden’s assertion that certain forms of inequality have to do with “rights to use narrative, 
with whose narratives are admitted to have cognitive function” (cited in Blommaert 2001, 
413), Blommaert notes that the asylum system as interpreted in Europe “involves a complex 
set of discursive practices and language ideologies that are, in practice, being used as criteria 
for ‘truth’, ‘trustworthiness’, ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’” (414). Such exclusionary 
discursive practices are often “far beyond the reach of African asylum seekers not only 
linguistically but also narratively and stylistically” (414). Because the asylum system does 
not allow for anecdotal elements, the contextual and emotional information claimants can 
provide is limited. Moreover, as I have explored elsewhere (Woolley, 2014), the implications 
of consigning to text the original oral narrative provided by the claimant are significant. As 
the oral narrative is transcribed, “remoulded, remodelled and re-narrated” (Blommaert 2001, 
438) by representatives of organisations and institutions with their own interpretive abilities – 
lawyers, welfare workers, translators and immigration officials – a series of documents are 
produced which are all ascribed to a single individual’s asylum claim. This revisionary 
process generates an ‘asylum story’ that is taken as definitive of the claimant’s experience. 
An unacknowledged process of narrative organization occurs here that fails to account for the 
instabilities arising from these varying acts of enunciation and appropriation. It allows the 
story to be co-opted in ways that deprive the claimant of control over its narrative 
permutations and fixes their story into a particular version of the truth.  
The peculiar narrative restrictions of the asylum claims system are also embedded in 
the prevailing structure of asylum interviews which, as well as being delimited by the 
inevitable challenges of language difference, are mostly conducted using a “rigid, 
interrogative, closed question and direct answer format” (Baillot, Cowan and Munro 2009, 
209). Prevented from narrating their experiences freely, asylum seekers must instead answer 
a series of questions that dictate the terms on which the asylum narrative may be told by 
limiting the range of responses available to the claimant. These interrogative conditions have 
a clear impact on the resulting narrative by shaping it along empirical lines which exclude 
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what Blommaert (2001) calls “home narratives”; that is “contextualizing accounts” which are 
“often long and sometimes anecdotal stories on the situation in the refugees’ home societies, 
involving usually very detailed information on local events, the crisis from which refugees 
fled and so on” (415). Without this information, the asylum story is read on purely positivist 
terms, taking into account only those details that can be empirically proven and counted as 
fact. Though it goes unacknowledged, such institutional systems of codification shape the 
narrative contours of the asylum story by demanding a coherent, historically-accurate version 
of events. Moreover, as I will elaborate further below, Alison Jeffers’ focus on the 
performativity of asylum reveals that the presentation of the asylum story elicits the 
performance of a normative refugee selfhood which conforms to certain “cultural 
expectations” (Jeffers 2011, 17) of how a refugee should behave. So we have a legal process 
for determining refugee status premised on an ascertainable division between fact and fiction, 
and which disavows its own narrative instabilities. As such it fails to take into account 
linguistic and historical nuance, the memorial revisions of trauma, or its own structural 
performative aspects. 
Jacques Rancière’s analysis of the relationship between art and politics focalizes the 
asylum system’s coercive narrative logic that insists on a clear dividing line between fact and 
fiction; a line which has the material effect of designating who has the right to protection 
under the international asylum regime. Setting our own “aesthetic age” against Aristotelian 
thinking, Rancière argues that, poetic “story” and “history” have become deeply intertwined 
and, in fact, adhere to the same processes of narrativization: “the logic of descriptive and 
narrative arrangements in fiction becomes fundamentally indistinct from the arrangements 
used in the description and interpretation of the phenomena of the social and historical world” 
(2007, 37). A news story, for example, presents events according to a causal logic which may 
not reflect the way things actually happened. The asylum process, too, is determined by story; 
yet here unyielding narrative terms prioritise causal logic over the intimate details of 
Blommaert’s “home narrative”. The problem here is not the narrative ordering in itself – as 
Rancière argues, “[t]he real must be fictionalized in order to be thought” (38) – but the 
prescriptive context, whereby asylum seekers cede narrative agency over their stories to 
institutional procedures. Rancière glosses his assertion that “testimony and fiction come 
under the same regime of meaning” (37), by noting that: 
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It is not a matter of claiming that everything is fiction. It is a 
matter of stating that the fiction of the aesthetic age defined 
models for connecting the presentation of facts and forms of 
intelligibility that blurred the border between the logic of facts 
and the logic of fiction. [...] Writing history and writing stories 
come under the same regime of truth. This has nothing 
whatsoever to do with a thesis on the reality or unreality of 
things. (38) 
 
This clarification is crucial given that an awareness of the material effects of war, persecution 
and torture are central to the assurance of rights and justice for refugees. Far from repudiating 
the importance of testimony, Rancière argues that both modes of meaning making are bound 
to narrative forms. The recent growth in creative non-fiction shows that much contemporary 
literary production – not least depictions of refugees and asylum seekers, as we shall see – 
blurs the line between documentary and fictional storytelling as conventionally perceived. 
Politics, like literature and art according to Rancière, constructs “‘fictions’, that is to say 
material rearrangements of signs and images, relationships between what is seen and what is 
said, between what is done and what can be done” (39, original emphasis). These 
arrangements and relationships are constructed in order to make intelligible what would 
otherwise be “condemned to presenting events according to their empirical order” (36). The 
point here is not to negate the need for testimony, to bear witness to atrocity, but to 
acknowledge its basis in the same narrative configurations as fiction as a mode of making 
sense of such events.vi Such an acknowledgment is inimical to the international asylum 
regime, which not only elides the subjectivity of the decision-maker as participant in the 
narrative, but also imposes a coercive regime of fact-finding. Unacknowledged, these 
narrative instabilities codify the asylum seeker’s experience within markedly reductive 
narrative parameters. Yet more speciously, in coercing the claimant into its pursuit of 
veracity, the process elicits a negatively idealized version of events which may take the 
claimant even further from the truth, paradoxically undoing its claims to empirical discovery.  
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Literature and asylum  
 
Asylum stories are not confined to courts and interview rooms. They circulate in media, 
advocacy and creative fora, which, though not strictly speaking judicial spaces, nonetheless 
maintain a relationship with the law through the predominance of testimonial forms. Again 
marking the mid-twentieth century as a turning point in rights discourse, Lyndsey 
Stonebridge has drawn attention to the ways in which “the contingent hazards of ethical 
witnessing” implicit in testimonial transactions have come to dominate “postwar legal 
history” since the Eichmann trial in 1961 (2011, 4). Testimony has also become the 
prevailing narrative mode for refugee experience. For organisations like the Refugee Council 
and the UK-based Migrant Voices, testimony is an effective means of campaigning and 
advocacy for and by refugees; the cornerstone of a process of bearing witness to oppression, 
torture and marginalization. As Gillian Whitlock points out in her analysis of letters written 
between detained asylum seekers and their advocates in Australia, refugees often actively 
seek out opportunities to relate “the realities of lived experiences” outside the “formal 
testimony” format of the immigration interview (2009, 210). But although it aims to 
counteract the punitive terms of asylum decision making for the purposes of advocacy, 
refugee testimony can, at times, also collude with its narrative coercions by holding claimants 
to the same standards of authenticity as the asylum regime. Just as in the adjudication system, 
the documentary presentation of asylum stories, whether written or performed, presents a 
fixed, unchanging version of the truth. For audiences and readers of asylum testimony, as for 
immigration officials and judges, belief in the credibility of the narrative becomes the 
organising principle. In her book Postcolonial Life Narratives: Testimonial Transactions 
(2015), Whitlock provides further grounds for re-evaluating the conventional means by which 
refugees’ stories are heard. She notes that the infrastructure of “humanitarian storytelling”, 
which conventionally yokes together testimonial narrative and rights discourses has often 
been “a poor host for refugee testimony” (179) because refugees fundamentally destabilize 
given notions of what it means to be human. Refugees “bring to light uncertainties about who 
can be understood and felt to be human”, which, in turn, set “the limits of humanitarian 
storytelling and its capacity to reach ‘distant’ others” (Whitlock 2015, 179). Whitlock’s 
analysis of contemporary testimonial forms identifies a sense of exhaustion in a 
“cosmopolitan”, knowing audience which simultaneously desires and distains “the 
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commodification of distant suffering” (191). Readers of testimonial human rights literature 
are thus conscious that even as it seeks change for those represented, it can also participate in 
their exploitation.  
Models of ethical witnessing have also filtered into the creative sphere, where asylum 
stories tend to draw from testimony and verbatim sources. This is especially true of theatre 
and performance. Dramatic verbatim projects like The Asylum Monologues (launched in 
2006), which have actors voicing refugee narratives while seated facing the audience, have 
provided a flexible and portable means of enhancing the public presence of asylum stories 
and countering negative portrayals of refugees and asylum seekers in policy and mainstream 
media. This method of delivering testimony has set the benchmark for many theatrical 
engagements with asylum, which take advantage of the presentational modes theatre offers to 
impress upon audiences that they are bearing witness to authentic testimony.vii Less 
commented upon are the ways in which these presentational performance modes mirror the 
interaction between asylum claimant and immigration officer, meaning that audiences are 
implicitly encouraged to judge the credibility of the asylum story with which they are 
presented. Of course, theatre of asylum does not only work in docudramatic mode. Kay 
Adshead’s 2001 play in verse, The Bogus Woman, Anders Lustgarten’s, Lampedusa (2015), 
and Zodwa Nyoni’s Nine Lives (2015) are all dramatized, fictional engagements with asylum. 
Even here, however, all retain the presentational monologue style of testimony. As we shall 
see, the complexity of the confrontation between asylum claimant and official witness is the 
focal point of Adichie’s short story ‘The American Embassy’. Because prose fiction is not 
measured by the same “metrics of authenticity” (Smith and Watson, cited in Whitlock, 193) 
as verbatim and documentary narratives, Adichie is able to reimagine and reshape the 
encounter between asylum seeker and citizen/reader/immigration officer as a space in which 
Bloomaert’s “home narrative” is able to flourish.  
Novels and prose fiction have addressed the challenges testimonial forms pose by 
working with testimony in ways that draw attention to its complex relationship to fiction.viii 
Swedish writer Henning Mankell’s satirical novel The Shadow Girls (2012), about a self-
serving poet hoping to redeem himself by telling the stories of a group of refugee girls, 
presents a subtle but serious consideration of the role of literature in casting light on those 
who live in the shadows. More complexly, Dave Eggers’s “fictional autobiography” (Deng, 
n.d.) of Sudanese refugee Valentino Achack Deng What is the What? includes a preface by 
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Deng which addresses Eggars’ narrative ventriloquism while at the same time maintaining 
the story’s claim to truth and authenticity.ix Working explicitly within Rancière’s shared 
narrative logic of “story” and “history”, these texts aim to engender compassion and anger 
about the material injustices of asylum while retaining a sense of incredulity to the idea of an 
authentic or empirically discoverable subjectivity. These kinds of metafictional or hybrid 
prose narratives evince concerns about authenticity as a way of acknowledging the limitations 
of storytelling when it comes to extreme experiences or histories of injustice; an approach 
which forms part of broader and long-standing debates about fiction’s responsibility to the 
real. Peter Boxall’s reappraisal of this discussion in his recent critical introduction to post-
2000 literature cites these concerns as central to twenty-first century fiction. Boxall identifies 
a renewed “historical consciousness” (2013, 41) in much contemporary writing, which is:  
 
grounded in a keen awareness of history as event, history as a 
material force which is not simply produced by narrative, but 
also shapes and determines it. The ethical and political texture 
of the new fiction is coloured by this awareness, this sense of a 
historical and ethical imperative (41)   
 
This “historical and ethical” imperative, which often translates as a concern with “the ethics 
of accurate testimony” (66), is in part a response to the perceived ethical deficit of the 
postmodern historiographies prevalent in the twentieth century. But as Boxall is quick to 
point out, contemporary fiction does not stage a “post-theoretical reassertion of history as 
truth, history as a real state of affairs, which it is the task of the historical novelist simply to 
record or testify to” (42). Instead, this historically-conscious fiction reveals to its readers the 
complex relationship between narrative and experience; a relationship which is at its most 
fraught when shaped by historical injustice. Recent writing opens up and occupies “a difficult 
gap between fiction and history” (Boxall 2013, 67). The renewed ethical awareness and 
historical responsibility that Boxall identifies in twenty-first century literature has found keen 
expression in representations of forced migration, which, while attempting to tell the unheard 
stories of refugees and asylum seekers also expresses a degree of self-reflexive anxiety about 
the possibility of doing so.  
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Questions over the textuality of history have nowhere been more rigorously addressed 
than in postcolonial studies, where the debate has bifurcated into broadly poststructuralist and 
broadly materialist approaches. While there is no need to recapitulate these debates here, it is 
worth highlighting the asylum system as a site that crystallizes these tensions by 
demonstrating both the damaging implications of an over dependence on the verifiability of 
the past and the irrefutable need for an account of historical events, both for the purposes of 
securing refuge and for raising awareness of the oppressions, inequalities and injustices that 
force people to seek asylum. As the ever-increasing need for adequate responses to forced 
migration and displacement is part of colonialism’s legacy of uneven development and 
entrenched systems of global inequality, the international asylum regime marks a move from 
negotiations over who is the bearer of human rights in the period of decolonization, to 
contemporary interrogations of the complicity of humanitarianism in continuing modes of 
oppressing ‘others’. Trapped within a contradictory and paralyzing system, asylum seekers 
need an account of their experiences, but not one that shuts down on historical contingency or 
memorial trauma by forcing claimants to conform to pre-defined narrative terms. It is in this 
sense that the asylum system unwittingly exposes the gap between narrative and experience 
identified by Boxall as a defining condition of contemporary literature. As I will now argue, 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s short story, ‘The American Embassy’ reveals that the 
international asylum regime system – as a space in which historical narratives of oppression 
and in justice are heard – is deeply implicated in regimes of exclusion that operate through 
the regulation of narrative.     
 
Adichie and the danger of the ‘single (asylum) story’ 
 
Though not known for her metafictional literary techniques, Adichie’s work dwells self-
consciously in the “difficult gap between fiction and history” (Boxall 2013, 67). In much of 
her writing, she evinces a reflexive concern with the legitimacy of stories that suggests a 
desire to grapple with the vexed question of how to bear witness to marginalised 
experiences.x This question is addressed explicitly in her 2009 TED talk, ‘The Danger of a 
Single Story’. Describing her life in reading and writing, Adichie recounts an incident early 
on in her career when she was told by one of her professors that because her novel featured 
characters who were well-nourished and drove cars, that it was not “authentically African”. 
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The professor, it seemed, subscribed to the “single story” of Africa, which depicts only 
impoverished, starving individuals and trades in images “of difference, of darkness”. Adichie 
is concerned in her talk with the ways in which these repeated images of Africa become 
entangled with a certain notion of authenticity, and the single story they transmit gains a 
strength of currency that displaces the varied and multiple experiences of contemporary 
Africa. The single story not only “robs people of their dignity”, but it also makes the 
“recognition of our equal humanity difficult” by emphasizing “how we are different rather 
than how we are similar”. Alongside ‘The American Embassy’, many of the short stories in 
The Thing Around Your Neck take up questions of authenticity often asked of and by 
postcolonial migrant authors.xi One satirical sketch, ‘Jumping Monkey Hill’, is set at a 
writers’ retreat outside Cape Town and features a fictional version of her creative writing 
professor for whom only stories of war, dictatorship and starvation can represent what he 
calls “the real Africa” (Adichie 2009a, 108). Those authors who write about homosexuality in 
Senegal, or the life of a secondary school teacher in Harare do not make it into the professor’s 
literary magazine because, for him, these stories are not “reflective of Africa, really” (Adichie 
2009a, 108). For Adichie, “Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person, but 
to make [a single story] the definitive story of that person.” Her words here place her within a 
theoretical tradition critical of cultural imperialism, according to which “the power to narrate, 
or block other narratives from forming and emerging” (Said 1993, xiii) is a central means by 
which hegemonic cultures operate. They also provide an accurate description of the ‘single’ 
asylum story, which comes to define refugees through a set of pre-existing legal and cultural 
narratives. Adichie’s critique of this process in ‘The American Embassy’ depicts an 
institutional context which robs people of their dignity, challenges our ability to recognise our 
shared humanity and, further, deprives certain constituencies of selfhood through the 
privileging of a “definitive” refugee plotline.    
‘The American Embassy’ tells the story of a woman whose toddler is killed by 
militants in pursuit of her dissident journalist husband in Nigeria during the final years of the 
Abacha dictatorship in the 1990s. As government forces are likely to come after her too, the 
woman’s friends urge her to apply for asylum at the American Embassy in Lagos, reminding 
her that to be granted entry to the United States she must have a convincing story. She duly 
arrives at the embassy to make the claim but finds that she cannot bring herself to describe 
her son Ugonna’s death to the incredulous official behind the glass. In fact, she would 
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“gladly” die before she “hawked Ugonna for a visa to safety” (139). To do so she would have 
to present her story in ways that the immigration officer would find plausible; this includes 
making sure she does not hesitate when answering questions, and remembering to cry, but not 
“cry too much” (134). Faced with a choice between framing her story within the narrative 
demands of the asylum application process or remaining silent, she chooses the latter, 
preferring to risk her own life than have the details of her son’s death picked over for 
inconsistencies. In a legal context that requires a story in order to function, this act of 
narrative withholding is significant. The woman’s refusal mounts an effective challenge to 
the coercive narrative context of legal decision making on asylum, but it also models a 
relationship between the asylum seeker and the citizen/reader outside the legal framework of 
the asylum interview by sharing with readers the contextual and psychological details that are 
withheld from the immigration official. Here, Bloomaert’s “home narrative” is allowed to 
flourish.  
Although she does not make use of the devices and conventions of human rights 
literature as traditionally conceived in order to engender empathy or promote social justice, 
Adichie’s critique of the asylum regime in ‘The American Embassy’ is as sharp as those that 
rely on testimony as a discrete mode of meaning making. One of the most striking aspects of 
Adichie’s depiction of the asylum determination process in ‘The American Embassy’ is the 
extent to which, in her hands, it becomes a narrative forum open to the performative 
techniques of storytelling. If she is to convince her sceptical audience of the veracity of her 
story, the woman must strategically deploy her rhetorical skills to generate a believable 
performance of the truth. Asylum seekers are accustomed to the tactical deployment of 
narrative. As Alison Jeffers notes, during the claims process asylum seekers must perform a 
normative version of refugee selfhood, one which “conform[s] to cultural expectations of 
refugees, particularly in relation to suffering” (2011, 17); this includes “silence, passivity, 
trauma and victimhood” (42). Where evidentiary documentation does not exist or is 
unavailable, adjudicators turn to bodily evidence such as scars and marks of torture, or, 
implicitly, on the degree to which the claimant is able to conform to the system’s specific 
storytelling conditions: to “play the role of ‘Convention Refugees’” (Jeffers 2011, 17, 
original emphasis). In the asylum interview, then, effective storytelling can mean the 
difference between life and death. In fact, the woman’s interaction with the official in ‘The 
American Embassy’ presents the system as precluding, rather than ascertaining, an authentic 
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presentation of the facts. Note the careful stage management by the woman’s friends, who 
warn her not to “falter” as she answers questions, or “overdo it”; she should cry, but not “cry 
too much” (Adichie 2009a, 134). Setting the terms on which grief may be expressed, the 
performance must be coherent, credible, but it should also convey vulnerability. The 
woman’s refusal to perform her own grief suggests, in part, a need to safeguard a sense of 
selfhood in the face of systematic institutional erasure. To conform to the official’s narrative 
expectations would be to exile herself not only from her country, but also from her own 
experience, which would be reshaped to fit the Convention criteria. Her defiant act also 
illuminates the performative aspects of a system which purports to be grounded in empirical 
truth but in fact operates at the intersection of representation and experience. By refusing to 
perform, Adichie’s protagonist frustrates the operation of asylum law, revealing the 
methodological fault lines at the core of the legal process. If the claimant’s mode of 
performance is as important as the narrative content in securing their safety, the clear 
distinction between fact and fiction the legal procedure seeks to uphold as a basis for 
credibility begins to break down.  
Like ‘Jumping Monkey Hill’, ‘The American Embassy’ depicts an economy of 
storytelling which entails decisions about which stories may be understood as authentic or 
plausible. In the context of asylum, however, the need to testify to a real experience is a 
matter of life and death, even as the possibility of bearing witness to that experience must 
always confront the limits of narrative to undertake this task. Journalistic storytelling 
provides a focus for this tension in Adichie’s story. The woman’s husband is a journalist and 
editor of the anti-Abacha newspaper The New Nigeria and, according to the man behind her 
in the queue outside the embassy, is a “truly brave” man who risks his life “to tell us the 
truth” (135). However, in documenting the atrocities of the Abacha regime, the lives he puts 
at risk are those of his wife and son after his stories begin to garner international attention. 
The BBC runs an interview with an exiled Nigerian professor who comments that the 
woman’s husband should receive a Human Rights Award because “He fights repression with 
a pen, he gives a voice to the voiceless, he makes the world know” (137, original italics). 
Conforming to the cultural expectations of the Convention refugee, which includes the 
narrative cause and effect of persecution on the basis of his journalism, the husband escapes 
to Benin and from there secures sanctuary in the United States. As well as documenting the 
abuses of the dictatorship, then, the articles also tell the story of a heroic journalist who 
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sacrifices himself in the name of democracy; a man who comes to resemble an “excited 
messiah” (135). What her husband’s admirer in the queue does not know is that the woman 
was herself a political activist: “she might have told him of her own journalism, starting from 
university in Zaria, when she had organised a rally to protest General Buhari’s government’s 
decision to cut student subsidies”, or “how she wrote for the Evening News here in Lagos, 
how she did the story on the attempted murder of the publisher of The Guardian” (136). The 
imbalance in these twin narratives, whereby the woman’s is already devalued and unheard, 
demonstrates the contingency of claims to authenticity and the danger of the ‘single story’, 
which occludes as much as it exposes. The woman’s past activism provides the kind of 
historical context for her asylum claim prohibited by the narrative structure of the claims 
process, which seeks only clear cause and effect. Unlike her husband’s story, her’s does not 
fit neatly into the terms of validation provided by the asylum system, which apportions rights 
of protection by effecting social and political hierarchies through narrative.  
The woman’s refusal to share her story with the immigration officer at the American 
Embassy rejects these slight narrative conditions and, turning her back on the official at the 
end of the story, she resists interpellation into the duplicitous terms of the asylum system and 
the instrumentalization of a ‘single’ asylum story. This is a tactic which, as David Farrier 
describes it, “sidesteps the process of entextualisation affected by the official interview” 
(2012, 170). By withholding her narrative, the woman withholds her own “narratability” 
(Farrier 2012, 170), that is, the process of becoming the object of another’s narrative power. 
Farrier’s extensive analysis of the refusal to speak in the context of asylum draws on Herman 
Melville’s Bartleby, whose refrain ‘I prefer not to’ is echoed in Abdulrazak Gurnah’s 2001 
novel By the Sea, where it is uttered by Saleh, an elderly asylum seeker arriving in Britain 
from Zanzibar. Both Bartleby and Saleh refuse to participate in systems that disempower 
them by asserting “a subjective selfhood that chooses to represent its exclusion in terms of 
that exclusion”; a formula that “contests the effacement of the refugee subject by deliberately 
occupying that effacement, foregrounding exclusion through the anomic language of asylum” 
(Farrier 2012, 176). By refusing to provide any details which might jeopardise his position as 
abject and therefore legally requiring asylum, Saleh makes “the law’s narrow margins of 
narrative tolerance work to his advantage” (Farrier 2012, 170). Though the woman’s refusal 
to engage with the legal process is different in kind to that of Saleh – she exits the system 
altogether – both ‘The American Embassy’ and By the Sea suggest a dialogic approach to the 
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asylum story which confers agency for the telling on the claimant. Ultimately rejecting 
silence as a tactic, Saleh shares his story with Latif, another Zanzibari refugee whose 
migration story forms the second strand of the novel’s narrative. For Farrier, their dialogue 
affirms the narratability of the self over and against Salah’s initial negative refusal to narrate. 
In a similar gesture, the woman in Adichie’s story affirms her own narratability, not within 
the text, but extra-diegetically – with readers. The imbalance of power in the asylum 
interview context is redressed in ‘The American Embassy’ because the details are revealed to 
the reader rather than the immigration officer; providing an alternative narrative space for the 
telling of the multivalent asylum story outside and beyond the restrictions of the legal 
context.  
This is shown most eloquently during the confrontation between the woman and the 
US government agent who will make a decision on her claim. Having waited in the queue all 
day, the woman finds herself unwilling to share the details of her story as she stares at the 
official on the other side of the glass barrier:  
  
Her son had been killed, that was all she would say. Killed. 
Nothing about how his laughter started somehow above his 
head, high and tinkly. How he called sweets and biscuits 
“breadie-breadie.” How he grasped her neck tight when she held 
him. How her husband said that he would be an artist because 
he didn’t try to build with his LEGO blocks but instead arranged 
them side by side, alternating colors.  
(139). 
  
What is withheld from the immigration officer is in the same moment revealed to readers in a 
form of dramatic irony that marks a clear distinction between two narrative frames: the legal 
process and the literary text, highlighting the vast discrepancy between the legal mechanism 
for apportioning rights and the multivalent experiences, emotions and aspirations that 
constitute an asylum claim. The narrative disjuncture between the woman’s internal 
commentary and the procedural characteristics of the interview in this moment not only 
reveals the latter as a forum which closes down on narrative freedom but it also doubles the 
asylum story as readers encounter its legal and its literary form. What the system occludes, 
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but Adichie’s story allows us to see, is that decisions over who is deserving of rights depend 
on a particular kind of narrative performance; one which the woman refuses to provide. The 
confrontation between the official and the claimant thus exposes the moments when text, 
readers and performance intersect, demonstrating the complicity of the asylum system within 
those fictional narrative forms it disavows in its quest for historical accuracy. This is not to 
suggest that the story posits the fictionality of all asylum claims. Rather that Adichie 
performs a writerly balancing act by questioning the search for an authentic narrative of 
asylum while simultaneously upholding the importance of testifying to experience. Unlike  
re-presented verbatim and testimonial asylum stories, Adichie’s prose fiction is presented 
without peritexts pointing to validating documentary sources and, significantly, readers are 
not asked to pass judgement on the veracity of the woman’s story. Instead, the intimate 
relationship created between character and readers by the sharing of narrative detail creates a 
storytelling space free from legal regulation; one which makes no claims to historical fact, 
but nonetheless makes intelligible the traumatic histories that lie behind asylum claims. 
Refusing to engage with questions of authentic refugee selfhood, Adichie’s story disrupts 
both the claims process and the sharp distinction often drawn between authentic testimony 
and creative fiction. Fiction becomes a site capable of generating a “shared sense of 
humanity” (Adichie, 2009) outside the terms of institutional power systems. If, as Slaughter 
has shown, rights law and literature are historically entangled, then Adichie’s story offers one 
vision of their future engagement: ‘The American Embassy’ is not simply a critique of 
asylum law at the level of content, but itself generates the conditions for an alternative 
narrative interaction between asylum claimant and audience of their story.   
As well as affording readers a stereoscopic view of the asylum system – both legal 
and literary – ‘The American Embassy’ encompasses thematic dualities. The narrative entails 
both the events that led to the claim (the shooting of Ugonna), recalled as the woman stands 
waiting in the queue outside the embassy, and those surrounding the articulation of this 
experience. The woman’s refusal to “hawk” Ugonna in exchange for a visa resists the 
commodification of her asylum story, while alluding darkly to the way in which such stories 
are prey to journalists and state officials. So ‘The American Embassy’ is not simply the 
asylum story that lies behind the woman’s claim in all its rich psychological complexity, it is 
also the story of that narrative: how, where and when it may be told. For Adichie in ‘The 
American Embassy’, the relationship between “story” and “history” in our “aesthetic age” 
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(Rancière 2004, 37), is not only a question for literary discourses but should be addressed by 
legal and bureaucratic structures which determine rights. This critical reflection is most 
pressing when those international laws in place to protect rights assert an inflexible legal 
plotline which have material and often detrimental effects. The question of how, where and 
when the asylum story may be told is one that has wide resonance for decision making on 
asylum, which remains subject to critique by rights organisations. In Britain, a number of 
recent studies have confirmed a long-suspected ‘culture of disbelief’ in Home Office decision 
making. Reports by Amnesty International UK (2004; 2013) Asylum Aid (2011) and the UK 
Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (2013) have all pointed to failures in the adjudication 
process, in particular around the issue of what constitutes a credible claim. Bringing to bear 
the concerns about narrative and authenticity raised in this discussion onto institutional 
mechanisms for regulating lives submits this “most intensely narrative mode of legal 
adjudication” (Millbank 2009, 2) to the kind of critical scrutiny that focuses on connections 
between discourse and materiality, narrative appropriation, and the authority to narrate. This 
kind of analysis is vital at a moment in which legal procedures for determining asylum 
protection and refugee status are under pressure. At the time of writing, Turkey and the EU 
have agreed a deal for refugee ‘trades’ that could potentially do away with the Refugee 
Convention altogether. Under the terms of the deal, Greece will return to Turkey so-called 
‘irregular’ migrants in exchange for the increased resettlement in EU countries of Syrian 
refugees residing in Turkey. Alongside innumerable moral questions, the deal raises an 
important legal one because it contravenes the terms of the Convention, which stipulates that 
refugee cases should be assessed on an individual basis. The implication of this is that asylum 
seekers will no longer have any opportunity at all to relate their experiences as a means of 
gaining protection. So perhaps ‘asylum crisis’ is more appropriate than ‘refugee crisis’ to 
describe a situation in which the international processes for dealing with asylum claims, and 
its interpretation at a national level, seems increasingly inadequate for today’s complex and 
multivalent refugee movements. In a context in which asylum stories may not even be heard 
by those institutions able to apportion rights, creating spaces for nuanced narratives of 
refugee experience has never been more important.   
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i See Gibney (2004) for a detailed examination of asylum policies in the UK, the US 
Germany and Australia, and the ethics of refugee determination.   
ii Political theory has engaged extensively with Arendt’s contemporaneous analysis of human 
rights law and the rights of man in general. See esp. Agamben (1998), Balibar (2007) and 
Benhabib (2004). 
iii Though outside the scope of this essay, it is important to note that the UN Refugee 
Convention is shaped by specific and historical geopolitical phenomena: namely, Nazism and 
Soviet totalitarianism. For a discussion of this context and the convention’s continued utility 
see Gatrell (2013) and Marfleet (2006). 
iv See Farrier (2012) and Woolley (2014). 
v The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees has been signed by 147 countries. It is 
worth noting, however, that the African Union (originally the Organization of African Unity) 
works with a much broader definition of a refugee, which includes those fleeing from 
‘external aggression, occupation [or] foreign domination’ (OAU, 1974. Available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf). 
viClassic discussion of this relationship can be found in trauma studies. See esp. Caruth 
(1996), Felman and Laub (1996) and La Capra (1994).  
vii In line with a flourishing of verbatim and documentary theatre making in the early 2000s, 
the use of documentary or testimonial sources in theatre of asylum means that it attracts 
commentary focused on issues of ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’. For example, reviews of 
Timberlake Wertenbaker’s 2001 asylum play Credible Witness assessed the extent to which it 
‘rang true’, see Morely (2001) and de Jongh (2001). For a discussion of documentary asylum 
performance in the Australian context see Cox (2015).  
viii Many prose narratives about asylum seekers and refugees emphasise the research authors 
have undertaken on the topic in peritexts, see for example, Cleave (2009) and Clanchy 
(2009). Other recent novels about asylum in the British context include, Finch (2013), 
Chikwava (2009).  
ix See Whitlock (2015) and Boxall (2013) for extended readings of What is the What in 
relation to testimony, history and fiction. 
x See Ngwira (2012) for a discussion of Half of a Yellow Sun in relation to authorship and 
history. Boxall (2012) includes a reading of this novel in relation to the notion of a global 
community.   
xi See Huggan (2001) and Brouillette (2007). 
 
 
 
 
Word Count: 8,874 
